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Policy Point-Counterpoint: Should Political Representation in a Nation-State be 
Reserved only for Citizens, or should it Encompass all Residents regardless of Status 
within a National Polity? 
The question of political representation is a cornerstone of modern political theory. At the 
least implied since the seventeenth century by way of the work of Hobbes and Locke, it has been 
an increasing assumption since the Age of Revolution that all majority-age individuals should 
have their voices heard in political systems and that people should govern themselves. As any 
number of historians have noted, the growth of democracy is one of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries’ major trends.1 
Two intersecting problems complicate representation: for whom and in what way? I.e., 
while most democracies are built off of universalistic principles, it is only recently that we have 
imagined “international constitutions” in the form of covenants that might guarantee freedoms to 
the person regardless of community membership. But do they? The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) notes that “everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”2 While the general 
universalism of the Declaration would seem to suggest that all should be citizens, not everyone 
may have a nation or, as Hannah Arendt put it, a “community” in which they are sanctioned.3 Or, 
if not that, many may live far from their home communities for a broad number of reasons and 
under a range of legal statuses vis-à-vis the country in which they reside. 
In 2019, the U.S. brought the question of political representation to a head with the 
Trump administration’s attempt to include a citizenship question on the 2020 U.S. census (“Is 
this person a citizen of the United States?”).4 Though defeated in the Supreme Court, the issue 
involved the U.S.’ system of apportioning the number of representatives to states by way of the 
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“whole number of persons in each state” (meaning not necessarily citizens).5 Conservatives’ 
concern was two things: either a) areas with large migrant populations might gain outsized 
influence or b) non-citizens might gain “stealth representation” as their interests would be part of 
a district’s overall concerns, or be potentially seen as the panoply of issues to which 
representatives need to tend (when their right to be seen was less than that of the citizen).6 This 
figures into a global picture accentuated by migration issues of which scholars have become 
increasingly aware: that there are determined stratifications between the rights of citizens and 
aliens who maintain a range of different statuses.7 Who deserves representation, or to be at least 
be counted in representational systems, why, and under what circumstances? 
This point-counterpoint features two perspectives. One, using social contract theory and 
liberal nationalism, argues “for the citizen.” Investment in the social contract means the 
alienation of the self to a specific body (the national community in question). One has a right to 
expect the fullest range of returns on that investment and participate as fully as the next member 
in the self-determination of the nation. Absent that, citizenship is reduced in meaning or it is 
unclear as to why have citizenship at all. Indeed, how do we organize communities without 
concrete certifications and standards as to who qualifies for full-blown membership? 
Alternatively, there is the universality of the person. Documents like the UDHR do not 
just prescribe rights for some, but civil rights should be provided for everyone, bar none. How 
can rights be guaranteed outside citizenship unless, at some level, all are heard or in some way 
counted in representational systems? Such is the argument of this debate’s second piece: that the 
UDHR discusses “citizens” and their nations when it really meant we all might be citizens, or 
that no one should be left without say in those governments which govern them or that said 
governments might somehow “count” their presence. 
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In both positions, recognition is a driving concept. How might all be recognized in their 
humanity, yet recognition not be reduced for others or somehow taken away? As Axel Honneth 
put it, the “struggle for recognition” might be the “moral grammar of social conflict.”8 How do 
we measure our power relative to one another and be seen as fully as possible as members of 
social bodies as well as human beings? 
Point: Political Representation in a Nation-State should be 
Reserved only for Citizens 
For this debate, I will use social contract theory and liberal-nationalist theory to argue 
that political representation should be reserved for citizens and not include all residents 
regardless of status in a given state. To discuss this question, it is necessary to provide a 
definition of the concepts of political representation and citizenship. Representation is the act of 
making something present which is otherwise not. For it to be political representation, the 
representative makes citizens and their interests present in public policy. Representation in a 
political sense is a public and institutionalized arrangement within democracies involving a range 
of actors and groups contributing to the business of governance.9   
As for citizenship, social contract theory generally argues that people gain citizenship 
rights by entering into a social compact requiring them to give up their natural freedom. From 
this, they gain security, civic freedom, and a more reasoned, if not moral, life. From a Lockean 
perspective, consenting to the social contract is done “only with an intention in everyone the 
better to preserve himself his liberty [and] his property.”10 From a Rousseauian perspective, the 
intent of the social contract is “to find a form of association which will defend the person and 
goods of each member with the collective force of all…under which each individual, while 
uniting himself with the others…remains as free as before.”11 Though Locke and Rousseau differ 
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on many points, both pose the social contract as a question of investment in the political 
community from which one gains a theoretically equal measure of rights, recognition, and 
security in return.12  
Again, in a representative democracy, the point of political representation is to make 
present the citizen in decision-making processes. From a Lockean perspective, political 
representatives should represent the individual interest of the citizen, who, when entering the 
social contract, agreed to “submit to the determination of the majority” (people consider and 
promote their interests, then express which path they seek through the decision-making 
process).13 This differs from the Rousseauian perspective, where it is not the individual’s will 
that the citizen should pursue, but the “general will,” or the larger good of the polity. However, 
significant is that, in either case, the point is that political representatives should make present 
the person who entered the social compact, whether that citizen has spoken for their individual 
interest or that of the society as a whole.  
When people have given themselves to the social contract, they have created a political 
community—a “commonwealth,” in Locke’s terms, or popular sovereign in a Rousseau-like 
vocabulary.14 This community has a right to self-determination: to establish the nation’s future in 
terms of laws and norms.15 This raises the question of who should be thought of as part of the 
body that determines itself. 
In her work on liberal nationalism, Yael Tamir argues that, through history, there has 
been a shift in our understanding of the nation which has resulted in “the right to self-
determination… understood as equivalent to the taxpayers’ right to political representation.”16 
This means that citizens—like the taxpayer—have a right to self-determination through political 
representation because they have invested in the community. Tamir further argues that the 
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political inclusion of groups previously outside the nation can undermine “the identification 
between citizens of the state and [its] members.”17 The relationship between a political 
representative and those whom they represent becomes unclear if non-citizens gain 
representation. In fact, that is especially if non-citizens cannot vote; how are their interests to be 
taken into account? Ensuring that political representation is only for citizens is a matter of 
protecting citizens’ investment in the community, which according to liberal nationalism is a 
good way to ensure citizens’ commitment to the community. Citizens have a right to democracy 
to ensure their interests are heard. However, as a function of this right, they have a right to know 
who is in the community and a right to know in what context decisions are made.   
Another issue is the relative weight of the citizen’s voice. That is to say that if the number 
of representatives apportioned to a community is based on the number of residents and not 
citizens (like in the U.S. Census), and two districts have the same number of citizens, yet one has 
a bigger population with non-citizens, that community could get more representatives. This 
would water-down the effectiveness of the vote of the citizen in the smaller district, in effect 
voting for a smaller number of representatives. There is a question of if this respects the equal 
rights of citizens or the equal effectiveness of their vote.18  
By arguing that political representation should only be for citizens, I do not argue that 
non-citizen residents should not have rights or gain consideration in public policy. There are 
human rights which may stand at a more basic level than the expansive rights of the citizen (life, 
shelter, etc.). My point is that the point of political representation is for members of a concretely 
identifiable community to have their fullest earned say in how community nation is shaped. 
Here, citizenship is key because it designates who, theoretically, has assented to the social 
contract and hence fully invested themselves in the national body.      
5
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Counter-Point: Political Representation in a Nation-State should encompass all residents  
 
When considering the question of who should be represented within a national polity, one 
might take several approaches. In this write-up, I approach the problem from a human rights 
perspective, by which I mean civil rights that should be upheld universally. 
  According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), “everyone has the 
right to take part in the government of his country.”19 By this, the UDHR indicates that citizens 
should have a say in how they are governed. This is in line with the “subjects-to-the-law-
principle,” which Avigail Eisenberg explains as holding that “all who are subject to the law 
ought to have a say in formulating [it].”20 Notably, the UDHR also offers a picture in which the 
nation-state is the main arena for political recognition, as is indicated by saying that the right is 
enacted “in the government of his country,” where, as such, the issue is citizens.21 However, as 
many note, there is a general attitude behind rights in which their spirit lies in “abstract 
universalism.”22 There may be a “spirit” of rights proposing political representation, if not 
participation, as intended to be universal—i.e., the idea was that should all be citizens. Here, we 
might understand the intention of human rights as to ensure that those “subject to the law” retain 
the “right to have rights” in the fullest sense. 
  Hannah Arendt introduced the terminology of the “right to have rights” to illustrate how 
we often do not live up to rights’ universal promises. Arendt points out that “[t]he fundamental 
deprivation of human rights is manifested…above all in the deprivation of a place in the world 
which makes opinions significant and actions effective.”23 Here, to hold one’s rights, one must 
first “belong to [an] organized community.”24 Following this, I suggest that we have a right to a 
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place in the world in which we are legally recognized and can make our opinions known, 
wherein our rights beyond representation can be secured and enacted. 
  Currently, it is nation-states that generally ensure political rights—thus, one needs to be a 
member of a nation (a citizen) to not risk being left rightless. This is comprehensible to an 
extent. As John Francis notes, many see a temporal and labor dimension in citizenship, where the 
right to claim the benefits of belonging to the nation is directly linked to one’s investment in 
national life—meaning that one has bought into a nation’s law, helped create them, worked in 
the nation, etc.25 Yet, we must ask if rights should depend on whether we have invested 
ourselves in specific communities—especially given that there may be many reasons why one is 
where one is—or whether rights are derived from being a member of the “human species.”26 In 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s words, is it not the case that we are all “born free,” wherein parceling 
out different kinds of rights to different humans (people) sets us on the slippery slope to no 
human rights at all?27 
  Moreover, arguments for maintaining political representation as only for citizens are 
fraught with contradictions. Again, we might recognize the argument that there are temporal and 
labor dimensions to citizenship, meaning, again, that to be a citizen, one must spend a significant 
amount of time within a nation and invest oneself in its practices and institutions.28 Francis 
nonetheless notes that “it is not uncommon…for people who have never lived in a certain 
country…to have voting rights and/or citizenship in that country” (e.g., through birth or descent 
from parents who have citizenship).29 This illustrates the dilemmas embedded within our 
conceptualization of the “citizen” versus “non-citizen,”  meaning that it seems contradictory for 
someone who has citizenship on such bases to retain the ability to participate in national life 
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(e.g., through voting), when, say, an illegal migrant who may have lived and worked in a 
particular place for years is not recognized in the same manner. 
  Furthermore, Wade Robison points out that “[a] citizen is an artifact.”30 This means that 
citizens are not naturally occurring phenomena and can therefore be regarded as an example of 
what legal scholars call “positive law.”31 Positive law refers to laws that are “arbitrary,” in the 
sense that [they] could be different, as opposed to what has intrinsic rational or moral force by its 
essence or nature.”32 Here, the way in which the statuses of citizens and non-citizens, and the 
rights extended to those, are granted can and do differ depending on the state in question. This 
leads us to the question of whether we, as a global community, can be clear on when the right to 
political representation is achieved, wherein do we in fact maintain a universal right to such a 
thing? 
  We thus have three issues: the notion that human rights beliefs propose political 
representation as a theoretical right for all, the dangers of not heeding such concepts, and 
citizenship as an unstable idea that makes it unclear at what point people maintain political rights 
unless one is to say that nation-states are the only source of law. Based on these points, I argue 
that there is a need to rethink how political representation works as well as consider the dangers 
of destabilizing the universal rights that citizenship is intended to protect. 
Conclusion 
As we reflect on these issues, several things become clear. Firstly, vis-à-vis the American 
case which drove initial interest in this question, it may not be fully clear what the Supreme 
Court’s decision means. Rejecting the census citizenship question on the basis of the Trump 
administration’s stated reason for it (that it would help them enforce the Voting Rights Act 
[1965]), they indicated that it might not be fully illegitimate to have such a question; however, 
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the reasons need accord with the spirit of the Constitution, which does not pin political 
representation to citizenship alone. This may not accord with a “maximalist” human rights 
position which would not make political representation political representation contingent on 
citizenship. However, it also might not accord with a narrow reading of social contract theory in 
which commonwealths or nations are only imagined as for citizens. Indeed, ultimately, it may 
line-up with the idea of “cosmopolitan right” proposed by Kant—which indicates that it is the 
“right of a stranger to not be treated in a hostile manner by another upon his arrival on the other’s 
territory.”33 Citizens rights and “strangers’” rights may differ. Both states and our fellow humans 
nonetheless need recognize the essential humanity of both. 
 Globally, however, we see a tendency towards states simply not seeking to engage such 
issues. Following increasingly popular hardlines on immigration, for example, the Danish Prime 
Minister recently declared her country’s interest in reaching “zero” asylum seekers and creating 
a system in which asylum seekers need apply for asylum at the Danish border, after which they 
would be flown to a third country (now speculated on as Rwanda) where they would remain even 
if their application were approved.34 This follows changes in national law drastically reducing 
the amount of social benefits that asylum seekers might get when compared with Danish 
citizens.35 In the face of such trends—present in a number of countries—one might be forced to 
think representation in a larger sense: where at all can one gain a legal foothold, and is any 
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